P r ior r e se a r ch h a s sh ow n th a t p eop le over estim a t e t h e lik e lih ood of con ju n ct ive e ve n t s a n d u n d e r e st im a t e t h e lik e lih ood of d isju n ct ive e ve n t s. We e va lu a t e d w h e t h e r p e op le 's r e gu la t or y focu s su cce ss w a s r e la t e d t o t h e m a gn it u d e of t h e se ju d gm e n t a l b ia se s. R e gu la t or y focu s t h e or y p osit s t h a t p e op le a r e gu id e d b y t w o d ist in ct m ot iva t ion a l syst e m s -p r om ot ion focu s a n d p r e ve nt ion focu s. Wh e n p e op le a r e p r om ot ion focu se d t h e y a t t e m p t t o b r in g t h e ir a ct u a l se lve s in t o a lign m e n t w it h th eir id e a l se lve s (s t a n d a r d s r e fle c t in g w is h e s a n d a sp ir a tion s). Wh en p eop le a r e p r e ve n t ion focu se d t h e y a t t e m p t t o b r in g t h e ir a ct u a l se lve s in t o a lign m e n t w it h t h e ir ou gh t se lve s (st a n d a r d s r e fle ct in g d u t ie s a n d ob liga t ion s). As p r e d ict e d , p r om ot ion su cce ss (i.e ., con gr ue n ce b e t w e e n a ct u a l a n d id e a l se lve s) w a s p osit ive ly r e la t e d t o t h e a ccu r a cy of d isju n ct ive p r ob a b ilit y e st im a t e s, w h er ea s p r eve n t ion su cce ss (i.e ., con gr u e n ce b e t w e e n a ct u a l a n d ou gh t se lve s) w a s n ot . Also a s p r e d ict e d , gr e a t e r p r e ve n t ion su cce ss le d t o m o r e a ccu r a t e con ju n ct ive p r ob a b ilit y e st im a t e s, w h e r e a s gr e a t e r p r om ot ion su cce ss d id n ot . ᭧ 2001 E lse vie r Scie n ce
P r ior r e se a r ch h a s sh ow n th a t p eop le over estim a t e t h e lik e lih ood of con ju n ct ive e ve n t s a n d u n d e r e st im a t e t h e lik e lih ood of d isju n ct ive e ve n t s. We e va lu a t e d w h e t h e r p e op le 's r e gu la t or y focu s su cce ss w a s r e la t e d t o t h e m a gn it u d e of t h e se ju d gm e n t a l b ia se s. R e gu la t or y focu s t h e or y p osit s t h a t p e op le a r e gu id e d b y t w o d ist in ct m ot iva t ion a l syst e m s -p r om ot ion focu s a n d p r e ve nt ion focu s. Wh e n p e op le a r e p r om ot ion focu se d t h e y a t t e m p t t o b r in g t h e ir a ct u a l se lve s in t o a lign m e n t w it h th eir id e a l se lve s (s t a n d a r d s r e fle c t in g w is h e s a n d a sp ir a tion s). Wh en p eop le a r e p r e ve n t ion focu se d t h e y a t t e m p t t o b r in g t h e ir a ct u a l se lve s in t o a lign m e n t w it h t h e ir ou gh t se lve s (st a n d a r d s r e fle ct in g d u t ie s a n d ob liga t ion s). As p r e d ict e d , p r om ot ion su cce ss (i.e ., con gr ue n ce b e t w e e n a ct u a l a n d id e a l se lve s) w a s p osit ive ly r e la t e d t o t h e a ccu r a cy of d isju n ct ive p r ob a b ilit y e st im a t e s, w h er ea s p r eve n t ion su cce ss (i.e ., con gr u e n ce b e t w e e n a ct u a l a n d ou gh t se lve s) w a s n ot . Also a s p r e d ict e d , gr e a t e r p r e ve n t ion su cce ss le d t o m o r e a ccu r a t e con ju n ct ive p r ob a b ilit y e st im a t e s, w h e r e a s gr e a t e r p r om ot ion su cce ss d id n ot . ᭧ 2001 E lse vie r Scie n ce Beh a vior a l decision t h eor y exa m in es h ow people's r elia n ce on cogn it ive heuristics influences (and often distorts) their judgments and decisions (e.g., Tver sky & Ka h n em a n , 1974). Beca u se cogn it ive h eu r ist ics ca n oper a t e a u t omatically, their impact may depend on people's level of access to their judgment and decision processes. F or exa m ple, on e of sever a l possible wa ys t o r edu ce the biasing effects of heuristics is to train people to be more cognizant of their ju dgment and decision pr ocesses (e.g., Ar kes, 1991) . If people cou ld on ly be more aware of these processes, t h e logic goes, the biasing influence of cogn it ive heuristics may be reduced.
Th e pr esent research focuses on the judgmental bias in which people misperceive the likelih ood of conjunct ive and disjunctive even t s (Ba zer m a n , 1998). Prior resea r ch h a s sh own t h a t people gen er a lly over est im a t e t h e pr oba bilit y of con junctive events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive events (Bar-H illel, 1973) . Th e t h eor et ica l a ppr oa ch gu idin g t h e pr esen t st u dy su ggest s that people's (m is-)per cept ion s of t h e likelih ood of con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive even t s do n ot depen d m er ely on t h eir level of a ccess t o t h eir ju dgm en t a n d decision pr ocesses. Ra t h er, t h e m ot iva t ion a l or ientations central to Higgins' (1998) r egu la t or y focu s t h eor y a lso ca n in flu en ce people's per cept ion s of t h e likelih ood of con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive even t s.
TH E OR E TICAL OVE RVIE W
Bot h con ju n ct ive a n d disjunctive events consist of multiple components. The likelih ood of a con junctive event is the probability that all com pon en t s in qu estion materialize. F or exa m ple, Ba zer m a n (1998) su ggest s t h a t wh en doctoral students enter the "final" year of their graduate programs, in which the la st r em a in in g h u r dle is t h e com plet ion of t h eir disser t a t ion , t h ey t ypica lly underestimate the amount of time needed to complete the program. Completing the program is a conjunctive event, in which all component tasks must be accomplished (e.g., proposing the dissertation, gathering data, statistically analyzing the data, writing, and defending it before a committee). Even if each com pon en t t a sk h as a high probabilit y of completion, the probability that all tasks actually will be completed is lower (a n d oft en con sider a bly lower ) t h a n the probability of completion of the typical task. Unfortunately, however, people tend not to recognize this fact; instead, they tend to overestimate the likelihood of conjunct ive events (Ba r-H illel, 1973) .
Th e likelih ood of a disju n ct ive even t is t h e pr oba bilit y t h a t an y on e of t h e mult iple com pon en t s in qu est ion m a t er ia lize. F or exa m ple, con sider t h e ca se of a n MBA st u den t in t h e t h r oes of a job sea r ch . F in din g a good job is a disju n ct ive t a sk. Wh ile t h e receipt of many offers is flattering (and may boost on e's n egot ia t in g power ), people u lt im a t ely ca n select on ly on e job. E ven if t h e pr oba bilit y of get t in g ea ch offer is qu it e low, t h e pr oba bilit y of get t in g a t lea st on e offer is h igh er (a n d oft en con sider a bly h igh er ) than the probabilit y of t h e typica l offer. H owever, people t en d n ot t o r ecogn ize t h is fa ct , a n d, in st ea d under est im a t e t h e likelih ood of disju n ct ive even t s (Ba r-H illel, 1973) .
Con junctive and disjunctive events occur regularly. Furthermore, the consequ en ces of m isper ceivin g t h e likelih ood of t h ese even t s cou ld be con sider a ble. Cit in g P er r ow (1984) , Ba zer m a n (1998) pr ovides som e pa r t icu la r ly com pellin g exa m ples: "In N orm al Accid en ts, Per r ow (1984) a r gu es a ga in st t h e sa fet y of technologies like nuclear reactors and DNA research. He fears that society sign ifica n t ly u n der est im a tes the likelihood of syst em fa ilu r e beca u se of ou r ju dgm en t a l fa ilure to realize the multitude of things that can go wrong in these in cr edibly com plex a n d in t er a ct ive syst em s" (pp. 31 -32). Given t h e fr equ en cy, and significance of the consequences associa t ed wit h m isper ceivin g the likelihood of conjunctive and disjunctive events, it is both theoretically and practica lly im por tant to determine why and when misperceptions occur.
Wh ile t h er e is a n ecdot a l a nd empirical evidence that people misper ceive t h e likelih ood of con ju n ct ive a n d disjunctive events, much less is known about the fa ct or s t h a t m a ke t h ese m isper cept ions more versus less likely to occur. The pr esen t r esea r ch seeks t o r edr ess t h is deficien cy. Beh a vior a l decision t h eor ist s posit t h a t on e ba sis of t h e sh or t com in gs in people's ju dgm ents and inferences is t h eir la ck of a ccess t o t h e dist or t in g in flu en ce of cogn it ive h eu r ist ics. Wh ile people's la ck of a ccess t o cogn it ive h eu r ist ics m a y be on e ba sis of ju dgm en t a l bia ses, it m a y n ot com plet ely a ccou n t for t h eir t en den cies t o m isper ceive t h e likelih ood of con ju n ct ive a n d disjunctive events. We suggest that motivational or ientation s (central to Higgin s', 1998, r egu la t or y focu s t h eor y) a lso m a y be in flu ential.
R egulatory Focu s T h eory
Self-r egu la t ion is t he process in which people seek t o br in g t hemselves (their beh a vior s a nd self-conceptions) into alignment with relevant goals and standards. Extendin g t h e ba sic h edon ic pr in ciple t hat people approach pleasure and avoid pain, Higgins (1997 Higgins ( , 1998 pr oposed t h a t people a r e gu ided by t wo dist in ct self-r egu la t or y syst em s, on e wit h a pr om ot ion focu s a n d t h e ot h er wit h a pr evention focus. Three factors differ en t ia t e a pr om ot ion focu s fr om a pr even t ion focu s: t he needs that people seek t o sa t isfy, t h e standards with which people try to bring themselves into alignment, and the outcomes which are salient to them. N eeds. Ma slow (1955), Bowlby (1969) , a n d ot h er s h a ve su ggest ed t h a t people a r e dr iven by a va r iet y of n eeds, som e per t a ining to growth, development, and nurturance, on the one hand, and others referring to safety, protection, and security, on the other. According to regulatory focus theory, the hedonic pr in ciple of a ppr oa ch in g plea sure and avoiding pain operates differently, dependin g u pon t h e n a t u r e of t h e u n der lyin g n eeds. Gr owt h /developm en t /n u r t u rance needs are at work when people are promotion focused, whereas safety/ pr ot ect ion /security needs are at work when people are prevention focused.
S tandard s. Cer t a in st a ndards that people try to meet refer to their hopes, wish es, a n d a spirations (e.g., the industrial scientist who is trying to create a new product); these are known as id eal selves. Ot h er st a n da rds refer t o people's du t ies, obligations, and responsibilities (e.g., the regulatory standards imposed upon organizations by a governmental agency); these are known as ou gh t selves. Wh en people a r e pr om otion focused they are trying to bring themselves in t o a lignment with their ideal selves, whereas when they are prevention focu sed t h ey a r e t r yin g t o bring themselves into alignment with their ought selves.
Ou tcom es. Human behavior is motiva t ed by people's desir es t o (a ) a t t a in posit ive ou t com es wh ich m a ke t h em bet t er off a n d (b) a void n ega t ive ou t com es wh ich m a ke t h em wor se off. Th e a t t a in m en t of posit ive ou t com es is em ph a sized by people wh o a r e pr om ot ion focu sed. Th e m or e t h a t pr om ot ion -focu sed per son s br in g t h em selves into alignment wit h t h eir idea l selves, t h e m or e t h ey exper ien ce t h e plea sure of a gain. If they fail to do so, they experience the pain of a non-gain. The avoidance of negative outcomes is emphasized by people who are pr even t ion focu sed. Th e m or e t h a t pr even t ion focu sed per son s br in g t h em selves in t o a lign m en t wit h t h eir ou gh t selves, the more they experience the pleasure of a n on -loss. If t h ey fa il t o do so, t h ey exper ien ce t h e pa in of a loss.
In summary, when promotion focused people's growth/development/nurturance needs motivate them to attempt to bring their actual selves into alignment wit h t h eir idea l selves; posit ive ou t com es t o be a t t a in ed a r e em ph a sized. Wh en pr even t ion -focu sed people's sa fet y/pr ot ect ion/security needs motivate them to attempt to bring their actual selves into alignment with their ought selves, negative outcomes to be avoided a r e em ph a sized.
R egulatory Focu s an d th e Perception of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Events
Im a gin e that the even t for wh ich people h a ve t o m ake a probability estimate con sist s of fou r com pon en t s (A, B, C, a n d D). In est im a t in g t h e likelih ood of the conjunctive event, people must judge the probability that Component A will occu r an d Com pon en t B will occu r an d Com pon en t C occu r an d Com pon en t D will occu r. In est imating the likelihood of the disjunctive event, people must ju dge t h e pr oba bilit y t h a t Com ponent A will occur or Com pon en t B will occu r or Com pon en t C will occu r or Com pon en t D will occu r. A cen t r al tenet of the pr esen t st u dy is that regulatory focus success influences people's strategic or ien t a t ion s t owa rd these two types of problems. For the reasons set forth below, we su ggest t h a t gr ea t er su ccess in t h e dom a in of pr om ot ion focu s lea ds people t o be more accurate in their estimates of disjunctive events, whereas gr ea t er su ccess in t h e dom a in of pr even t ion focu s lea ds people t o be m or e accurate in their estimates of conjunctive events.
Promot ion focu s is a ssocia t ed wit h t h e belief t h a t a n y of a number of action st eps a r e su fficien t for goa l a t t a in m en t . As F r iedm a n (1999) su ggest ed:
Con sider t h e goa l of seekin g a ccom plish m en t by m ea n s of a ccu m u la t in g va st wea lt h . Th is pr om ot ion goa l ca n be a t t a in ed in a va r iet y of wa ys, su ch a s by becom in g a su ccessfu l Wa ll St r eet t r a der, or by win n in g the state lottery, or . . . Once the in dividu a l h as successfu lly pu r su ed on e r ou t e t o t h is pr om ot ion goa l (i.e., wea lt h a cqu isit ion ) h e or sh e n eed not pursue alternative routes. . . . Any su ccessfu l r ou t e t o a pr om ot ion goa l is a su fficien t route. (p. 25, our emphases a dded).
In con t r a st , prevention focus is associated with the belief that all action steps are necessary for goal attainment. As Friedman (1999) put it:
Con sider the goal of securing one's home from burglars, murderers, and other societal riffr a ff. Mea n s of a t t a in in g t h is pr evention goal include keepin g win dows an d door s locked wh ile a sleep or a wa y fr om h om e. . . . In pr even t ion , da n ger (e.g., t h e pr ospect of a br ea kin ) ca n n ot be a ver t ed wit h cer t a inty unless all pa ths to danger are effect ively over com e (pp. 25-26, ou r em ph a ses a dded).
In sh or t , people's r egu la t ory focus influences their strategic or ien t a t ion t owa r d goa l attainment. Promotion focus leads people to attend to the sufficiency of a n y of a n u m ber of cou r ses of a ct ion t o br in g a bou t goa l a ttainment. Prevention focus leads people to attend to the necessity of multiple courses of action to br in g a bou t goa l a t t a in m en t (Roese, H u r, & P en n in gt on , 1999). P u t differ en t ly, pr om ot ion focu s lea ds people t o t h in k disjunctively, whereas prevention focus lea ds people t o t h ink conjunctively.
If t h is r ea son in g is correct, then people's success or effectiveness in achieving the goals associated with a given regulatory focus sh ou ld pr edict how well they do in est imating the probability of conjunctive and disjunctive events. Those wh o h a ve been m or e su ccessfu l in a ch ievin g t h eir pr om ot ion goa ls sh ou ld do better (be more accurate) in estimating the probability of disjunctive events. In contrast, those who have been more successful in achieving their prevention goa ls sh ou ld do better (be more accurate) in estimating the probability of con junctive events.
Th e pr esent study examined the relationships between people's regulatory focu s su ccess a n d t h eir est im a t es of t h e pr oba bilit ies of bot h con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive events. After completing measures of their regulatory focus success, pa r t icipa n t s per for m ed t he probabilit y est im a t ion t a sk u sed by Ba r-H illel (1973) , in wh ich people on a ver a ge wer e fou n d t o over est im a t e con ju n ct ive even t s a n d u n der est im a t e disju n ct ive even t s.
Hypothesis 1:Gr ea t er su ccess in t h e dom ain of promotion focus will lead to greater accuracy in peoples' est im a t es of t h e pr oba bilit ies of disju n ct ive even t s. Th a t is, t h e gr ea t er t h e pr om ot ion focu s su ccess, t h e less likely a r e people t o u n der est im a t e t h e pr oba bilit ies of disjunctive even t s.
Im plicit in H ypot h esis 1 a r e sever a l su bsidia r y pr edict ions which posit that the expected relationship between promotion focus success and the accuracy of disju n ct ive even t pr oba bilit y est im a t es will be gr ea t er t h a n (a ) t h e r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr even t ion focu s su ccess a n d t h e a ccu r a cy of disju n ct ive even t pr obabilit y estimates and (b) the relationship between pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d the accuracy of conjunctive event probability estimates.
Hypothesis 2: Gr ea t er su ccess in the domain of prevention focu s will lea d to greater a ccu racy in peoples'est im a t es of t h e pr oba bilit ies of con ju n ct ive even t s. Th a t is, t h e gr ea t er the prevention focus success, the less likely are people to overestimate the probabilities of con junctive events.
Im plicit in H ypot h esis 2 a r e sever a l su bsidia r y pr edict ion s wh ich st a t e t h a t the expected rela t ion sh ip bet ween pr even t ion focu s su ccess a n d t h e a ccu r a cy of con junctive event probability estimates will be greater than (a) the relationship bet ween pr om ot ion su ccess a n d t h e a ccu r a cy of con junctive event probability est imates and (b) the relationship between prevention focus success and the accuracy of disjunctive event probability estimates.
ME T H OD

Participan ts
Eighty-one students at Columbia University took part in the study. Each wa s pa id $8 for doin g so.
Proced u re
Prior to assessing participants' probability estimates of conjunctive and disjunctive events, we measured their regulatory focus success with a computerized ver sion of t h e fr equ en t ly u sed "Selves Qu est ion n a ir e" (H iggin s, 1989) . Th e Selves Qu est ionnaire is an idiographic measure in which participants describe certain self-r epr esen t a t ion s (e.g., H iggin s, Sh a h , & F r iedm a n , 1997). P a r t icipa n t s wer e first provided with a definition of their ideal self and ought self. Th eir idea l self wa s defin ed a s t h e t ype of person they ideally would like t o be; t h e t ype of person they hoped, wished, or aspired to be. Their ought self wa s defin ed a s t h e t ype of per son t h ey believed t h ey ought to be, the type of per son they believed it was their duty, obligation, or responsibility to be. They wer e t old that they would be asked to provide attributes that described their idea l a n d ou gh t selves. Th e a t t r ibu t es descr ibin g the ideal self had to be differen t fr om those descr ibin g t h e ought self, and all attributes were to be provided as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Participants then listed three ideal attributes and three ought attributes in a seem in gly r a n dom or der : on e idea l a t t r ibute followed by two ought attributes, another ideal attribute, another ought attribute, and a final ideal attribute. Aft er listing each of the ideal attributes, participants were asked to rate the ext en t t o wh ich they ideally would like to possess the attribute (ideal extent) and the extent to which they actually possessed the attribute (actual/ideal ext en t ) on a 4-poin t sca le r a nging from 1 to 4. Respon se opt ion s wer e sligh tly, m oderately, a great deal, and extrem ely. Similarly, a ft er list in g ea ch of t h e ou gh t attributes, they were asked to rate the extent to which they ought to possess the attribute (ought extent) and the extent to which they actually possessed the attribute (actual/ought exten t ) on the same 4-poin t sca les.
As is cu st om a r y in m a n y pr eviou s st u dies of r egu la t or y focu s (see H iggin s, 1997, 1998, for r eviews), su ccess in t h e t wo dom a in s of r egu la t or y focu s wa s ba sed on t h e degr ee of con gr u en ce bet ween people's a ct u a l selves a n d t h eir idea l (pr om ot ion ) a n d ought (prevention) selves. Thus, for each participant we com pu t ed sepa r a t e measures of their pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d t h eir pr even t ion focu s success.
Prom otion focu s su ccess.
Each actual/ideal extent rating was subtracted fr om it s cor r espon din g idea l ext en t r a t in g. Th e r esu lt a nt three difference scores wer e t h en su m m ed, su ch t h a t lower scor es r eflect ed m or e con gr u en ce bet ween self a n d st a ndard; the greater the congruence between actual self and ideal self, t h e st r on ger t h e pr om ot ion focu s su ccess.
Preven tion focu s su ccess.
Each actual/ought extent rating was subtracted fr om it s cor r espon din g ou gh t ext en t r a t in g. Th e r esu lt a n t t h r ee differ en ce scor es wer e t h en su m m ed su ch t h a t lower scor es r eflect ed m or e con gr u en ce bet ween self a n d standard; the greater the congruence between actual self and ou gh t self, the stronger the prevention focus success.
Aft er com plet in g t he measures of regulatory focus success participants were given a qu est ion n a ir e wh ich in clu ded t h e it ems used to assess t h eir est im a t es of con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive even t s. Th e instructions informed participants that the questionnaire was "designed to look at physical perception." The stimulu s mater ia ls wer e t a ken fr om t h ose u sed by Ba r-H illel (1973) . F u r t h er in for m ation about the stimuli (including examples of each) are provided in Tables 1-3 . Th e in st ructions were as follows: "Ta ke a look a t t h e displa y of X's a n d O's wh ich a ppea r below. We wa n t t o kn ow you r im pr ession of t h e path s. A path is TAB L E 1
An E x a m p le o f a Con ju n ct ive E ve n t St im u lu s
The above example has five rows, 10 colu m n s, a n d 70% X's in ea ch row.
TAB L E 2
An E x a m p le o f a Disju n ct ive E ve n t St im u lu s
The above example has nine rows, 10 colu m n s, a n d 10% X's in ea ch row.
TAB L E 3
De scr ip t ion of Con ju n ct ive a n d Disju n ct ive E ve n t Stim u li Number Number Propor t ion of X's Cor r ect Mea n est im a t e St im u lus of rows of colu m n s in ea ch r ow (%) pr oba bilit y (%) of sa m ple (%) N ote. Version 1 con sist ed of t h e A a n d B st im u li, wh er ea s Ver sion 2 con sist ed of t h e C a n d D stimuli.
any line which begins at any place (that is, with any X or any O) on the first row of the display, connects with any X or any O on the second row of the displa y, a n d so on , until it h a s r ea ch ed a n y X or any O on the last row of t h e displa y." F or the conjunctive tasks (e.g., see Table 1 ), the instructions continued, "Ou t of a ll of the possible pa t h s t h a t cou ld be dr a wn on the display below, plea se in dica t e t h e per cen t a ge of pa t h s t h a t a r e com posed on ly of Xs. Since this is a per cen t a ge you r a n swer m u st r a n ge a n ywh er e fr om 0-100%." F or t h e disju n ct ive t a sks (e.g., see Ta ble 2), t he instructions were "Out of all of the possible pa t h s t h at could be drawn on the display below, please indicate the per cen t a ge of pa t h s t h a t in clu de a t least on e X. Since this is a per cen t age, your answer must range anywhere from 0-100%."
Four different conjunctive stimuli and four different disjunctive stimuli were used. As in Ba r-H illel (1973), t h e st im u li differ ed in t er m s of t h e n u m ber of rows, the number of columns, and the propor t ion s of Xs a n d Os wit h in a given row. Information about all stimuli is presented in Table 3 . Each participant on ly m a de pr oba bilit y est im a t es for h a lf of t h e st im u li (i.e., t wo con ju n ct ive and two disjunctive). Thus, two different versions of the stimulus materials wer e u sed. Ver sion wa s t r ea t ed a s a con t r ol va r ia ble in the ensuing statistical analyses. The order in which participants responded to the stimuli was counterba la n ced. H a lf of the participants completed two disjunctive stimuli followed by t wo con ju n ctive stimuli; the other half completed two conjunctive stimuli followed by t wo disjunctive stimuli.
Depen d en t variables.
We fir st exa m ined participants'probability estimates of t h e con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive even t s. We t h en com pu t ed t h e differ en ce bet ween t h e object ively cor r ect pr oba bility and the estimates participants gave. For example, for the conjunctive event graphically illu st r a t ed in Ta ble 1 t h e object ively cor r ect a n swer is (.7) 5 , or 17%, whereas for the disjunctive event gr a ph ica lly illu st r a t ed in Ta ble 2 t h e object ively cor r ect a n swer is 1 Ϫ (.9) 9 , or 61%. F or the conjunctive stimuli, the difference score was participants' respon ses m in u s t h e object ively cor r ect a n swer. F or t h e disju n ct ive st im u li, t h e differ en ce scor e wa s t h e objectively correct answer minus participants' respon ses. (Differ en t su bt r a ct ion m et h ods wer e used because we expected participa n t s to overestimate the conjunctive events and underestimate the disjunctive events. By using different subtraction methods for the two events, we were able to create dependent variables in bot h in st a n ces in which high er scor es reflected more of a discrepancy in the expected direction.) Sepa r a t e in dices of t h e a ccu r a cy of con junctive and disjunctive estimates wer e ca lcu la t ed for ea ch person. The conjunctive index consisted of the average differ en ce bet ween t h e a ct u a lly cor r ect a n swer s a n d pa rticipants' est im a t es of their two conjunctive stimuli (coefficient ␣ ϭ .74), wh ile t h e disjunctive even t in dex con sist ed of the average difference between the actually correct answers and participants'estimates of their two disjunctive stimuli (coefficient ␣ ϭ .86). 1 1 Note that the measures of accuracy described t o t h is poin t con sist ed of dir ect ion a l differ en ce scor es. Th a t is, we a ssessed t h e ext en t t o wh ich pa r t icipa n t s' a ctual estimates devia t ed fr om object ively cor r ect a n swer s in the direction set forth by Bar-Hillel (1973) (overestimation in the TAB L E 4 Me a n s, St a n d a r d De via t ion s, a n d Cor r e la t ion s N ote. For promotion and prevention success, h igh er scor es r eflect less su ccess (more of a discrepancy between actual self and the ideal/ought standards). For conjunctive and disjunctive estimates, higher scores r eflect less accu racy (m or e of a discrepa ncy bet ween estimates given a n d t h e object ively cor r ect pr oba bilit ies).
* p Ͻ .05. ** p Ͻ .01.
Ad d ition al con trol variable.
Beca u se pa r ticipants' probabilit y est im a t es may be influenced by their knowledge of probability/statistics, they were asked (a t t h e very end of the questionnaire) to indicate the number of courses in pr oba bilit y or st a t ist ics t h ey h a d t a ken (r a n gin g fr om 0 t o 5 or m or e).
R E SULTS
Su m m a r y st a t ist ics for a ll of the variables are presented in Table 4 . Among the more not ewor t h y fin din gs wa s t h a t pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d pr even t ion focu s su ccess wer e m oderately related to one another, r(79) ϭ .46, p Ͻ .01. Wh ile t h is r ela t ion ship may reflect a generalized self-evaluation (a kin t o a measure of globa l self-est eem ), we exa m in e t he distinct impa ct of t h e t wo con st ructs by entering both of them as predictors in multiple regressions.
Prior to testing the hypotheses, we examined whether participants tended to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and underestimate the pr oba bilit y of disju n ct ive even t s. Th is en a bled u s t o eva lu a t e wh et h er ou r fin din gs r eplica t ed t h ose sh own by Ba r-H illel (1973) more than 25 years ago. In fa ct , t h ey did. Ta ble 3 sh ows t h e object ively cor r ect pr oba bilit ies a lon g wit h the average probability estimate made by participants. For all four of the ca se of con ju n ct ive even t s and underestimation in the case of disjunctive events). Analyses also wer e conducted on absolute difference scores, in which we examined the extent to which participa n t s' a ct u a l est im a t es devia t ed from t h e object ively cor r ect a n swer s, r ega r dless of wh ether such differences were in t h e dir ect ion fou n d by Ba r-H illel. As is sh own in t h e u pcom in g r esu lt s, t h e fin din gs wer e qu it e sim ila r r ega r dless of wh et h er dir ect ion a l or a bsolu t e differ en ce scor es wer e a n alyzed.
con junctive stimuli, participants overestimated the probabilities, often to a gr ea t ext en t . F or a ll fou r of the disjunctive stimuli, they underestimated the pr oba bilit ies, a ga in , oft en t o a considerable extent.
Tests of H ypoth eses
Mu lt iple r egr ession s wer e u sed t o t est H ypot h eses 1 a n d 2 t h a t (a ) gr ea t er pr om ot ion focu s su ccess wou ld lea d t o less of a tendency t o underestimate the pr oba bilit y of disju n ctive even t s a n d (b) gr ea t er pr evention focus success would lea d t o less of a t en den cy t o over est im a t e t h e pr oba bilit y of con ju n ct ive even t s. Predictor terms in the analyses of both depen den t va r ia bles wer e t h e in dependen t va riables of promotion focus success and prevention focus success and the control variables of number of probability/statistics courses taken and survey version.
Estim ation of d isjunctive even ts.
An a ddit ion a l control variable in these analyses was the dependent variable of participants' estimates of conjunctive even t s. Th e r egr ession r esu lt s a re shown in Table 5 . Of grea t est im por t a n ce, there was a significant effect of pr om ot ion focu s su ccess, t(75) ϭ 1.68, p Ͻ .05. In su ppor t of H ypot h esis 1, t h e st r on ger the promot ion focu s su ccess, t h e less likely wer e pa r t icipa n t s t o u n der est im a t e t h e likelih ood of disju n ct ive even t s. Th e on ly ot h er sign ifica n t fin din g wa s the effect associa t ed wit h the number of cou r ses t a ken in pr oba bilit y or st a t ist ics. As m igh t be expect ed, pa r t icipa n t s wh o h a d m or e cou r ses sh owed less of a t en den cy t o u n der est im a t e t h e pr oba bilit y of disju n ct ive even t s ( p Ͻ .05).
To illu st r a t e further the nature of the effect due to promotion focus success, we cla ssified pa r t icipa n ts as relatively high, medium, or low in their pr om ot ion focu s su ccess on t h e ba sis of a t er t ile split . We t h en com pu t ed t h e m ea n level of t h ese gr ou ps in t h eir t endencies to underestimate the likelihood of disjunctive even t s (a dju st ed for the other predictors in the regression analysis). Directional differ en ce scor es wer e u sed in t h is a n a lysis. Th e r esu lt s are shown in the bottom portion of N ote. Numbers in parentheses are for the analysis of absolute difference scores. For analysis of dir ect ion a l differ en ces scor es, over a ll F(5, 75) ϭ 1.46, p Ͻ .22; t ot a l R 2 ϭ .09. F or a n a lysis of absolu t e differ en ce scor es, over a ll F(5, 75) ϭ 2.04, p Ͻ .08; t ot a l R 2 ϭ .12. Mea n level of underest imation of disju n ct ive events as a function of promotion focus success: high success (M ϭ 30.65%), m ediu m su ccess (M ϭ 35.20%), low su ccess (M ϭ 42.67%).
the probabilities of the disjunctive even t s wa s a ppr oxim a t ely 40% gr ea t er among those least successful in the promotion domain (42.67%), relative to those who were most su ccessfu l (30.65%).
Estim ation of con junctive events. An a ddit ion al control variable in these analyses was the dependent variable of participants' estimates of disjunctive events. The results of the regression analysis appear in Table 6 . Of greatest im por t a n ce, the analysis yielded a sign ifica n t effect of prevention focu s, t(75) ϭ 2.02, p Ͻ .05. Con fir m in g H ypot h esis 2, we found that stronger prevention focus success led to less of a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of con junctive even t s.
To illu st r a t e further the nature of the effect due to prevention focus success, we cla ssified pa r t icipa n t s a s h igh , m ediu m , or low in t h eir pr even t ion focu s su ccess on t h e ba sis of a t er t ile split . We then computed the mean level of the three groups' tendencies to overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events, adjusted for t h e ot h er pr edict or t er m s in t h e r egr ession a n a lysis. Dir ect ion a l differ en ce scor es wer e u sed in t h is a n a lysis. Th e results are sh own in the bot t om of Ta ble 6. P a r t icipants with the least prevention focus success made con junctive probability estimates that were 77% more inaccurate (M ϭ 44.08%), relative to those with the most prevention focus success (M ϭ 24.84%).
Th e on ly ot h er va r ia ble t o have a significant influence in the regression analysis was the survey version. Participants were less likely to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events if they had been given Version 2 rather than Version 1, p Ͻ .001; see Ta ble 3 
for a descr ipt ion of t h e it em s com pr isin g the two ver sion s. Ba r-H illel (1973) a lso fou n d t h a t t h e t en den cy t owa r d over est imating conjunctive probabilities was greater on the items comprising Version 2 rather than Version 1.
Th e m or e important question is whether the effect of pr even t ion focu s su ccess wa s m oder a t ed by ver sion . To exa m in e t h is possibilit y, we a dded a n a ddit ion a l term to the regression analysis consisting of the interaction between prevention focu s a n d ver sion . In bot h t h e dir ect ional and absolute differen ce scor e a nalyses, the interaction effect did n ot even a ppr oa ch sign ifica n ce ( p va lu es Ͼ .20). In TAB L E 6 R e gr e ssion R e su lt s for E st im a t e s of Con ju n ct ive E ve n t s N ote. Numbers in parentheses are for the analysis of absolute difference scores. For analysis of dir ect ion a l differ en ce scor es, over a ll F(5, 75) ϭ 3.31, p Ͻ .01; t ot a l R 2 ϭ .18. F or a n a lysis of a bsolute differ en ce scor es, over a ll F(5, 75) ϭ 7.85, p Ͻ .01; t ot a l R 2 ϭ .34. Mea n level of overestimation of con ju n ct ive even t s a s a fu n ct ion of pr even t ion focu s su ccess: h igh su ccess (M ϭ 24.84%), m ediu m su ccess (M ϭ 32.95%), low su ccess (M ϭ 44.08%). ot h er wor ds, t h e fin din g of primary theoretical significance-the tendency for gr ea t er pr even t ion focu s su ccess t o lea d t o less of a t en den cy t o over est im a t e the probability of conjunctive events -did not depend upon the version that pa r t icipa nts completed.
Decom posin g th e pred ictor d ifferen ce scores.
Not e that the measures of regula t or y focu s su ccess con sist ed of differ ence scores. Promotion success wa s compu t ed by su btracting people's actual ideal self ratings from their ratings of how they would ideally like to be. Prevention success was determined by subtracting actual ought self ratings from ratings of how they believed they ought to be. As a r esu lt , it is n ot known if the significa n t effect s wer e a t t r ibu t a ble t o on e com pon en t , t h e ot h er, or a com bin a t ion of t h e t wo. To a ddr ess t h is qu est ion we r eran the regression analyses reported in Tables 5 and 6 , in which the sign ifica n t discr epa n cy pr edict or wa s r epla ced by it s t wo com pon en t pa r t s. Th u s, in t he analysis of disjunctive events prom ot ion focu s su ccess wa s r epla ced as a predictor by actual ideal self and the ideal self standard. In the analysis of con junctive events prevention focus success was replaced as a predictor by actual ought self and the ought self standard.
Four analyses were conducted (in which the prevention and promotion components were used as predictors of directional and absolute difference scores). In three of the four instances, the actual self component was significantly related to accuracy of probability estimates (at the .05 level) such that more positive actual self-evaluations led to more accurate probability estimates. In the fourth in st a n ce (a ct u a l ought self as a predictor of the absolute difference score of con junctive estimates), the effect was in the same direction, but was only marginally sign ifica n t ( p Ͻ .06).
Th e effect of t h e st andards compon en t wa s less con sist en t . Th e ou gh t st a n dard was significantly related to the accuracy of conjunctive estimates, as measured by the absolute difference scores ( p Ͻ .05), a n d the ought standard was marginally related to the accuracy of conjunctive estimates, as measured by the directional differ en ce scor e ( p Ͻ .06). In bot h cases, higher ought standards wer e a ssociated with less accurate probability estimates of the conjunctive even t s. H owever, t h e idea l self st a n da r d wa s u n r ela t ed t o t h e a ccu r a cy of est imates of the disjunctive events ( p va lu es Ͼ .10).
In su m , the actual self components of the measures of regulatory focus success wer e m or e consistently related to the accuracy of participants' probability est im a t es t h a n wer e t h e idea l self a n d ou gh t self st a n da r ds. Not e t h a t t h e ratings of the ideal and ought self standards differed in two ways from the ratings of the actual self, which may explain why the former were less consistently predictive of participants' probability estimates. First, the ideal and ou gh t self st a n da r ds gen erally were rated quite highly (M s ϭ 10.08 a n d 9.70, respectively, on a scale that ranged from 3 to 12), considerably higher than the ratings of actual ideal self and actual ought self (which were closer to the middle of the scale; M s ϭ 6.73 a n d 6.83, r espect ively). Secon d, the variance wa s som ewh a t lower in t h e ca se of t h e idea l self st a n da r d a n d ou gh t self st a n da r d (S Ds ϭ 1.46 a n d 1.62, r espect ively) t h a n it wa s for t h e a ct u a l idea l self a n d a ctual ought self (S Ds ϭ 1.89 a n d 1.86, r espect ively).
2
Tests of su bsid iary pred iction s. Th u s fa r the results show that promotion su ccess wa s posit ively r ela t ed t o the accuracy of disjunctive estimates, whereas pr even t ion su ccess wa s n ot , a n d t h a t pr even t ion su ccess wa s posit ively r ela t ed to the accuracy of conjunctive estimates, whereas promotion success was not. An other way to state these findings is that the relationships between regulatory focu s su ccess a n d ju dgm ental accuracy were significant when regulatory focus su ccess wa s con gr u en t (a s t heoretically defined) with the nature of the judgment to be made (e.g., promot ion focu s su ccess a n d disju n ct ive even t s), bu t that they were nonsignificant when regulatory focus success was incongruent (a s t h eor et ica lly defin ed) wit h t h e n a ture of the judgment to be made (e.g., pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d con ju n ct ive even t s).
Th e su bsidia r y predictions posited that the significant relationships which em er ged wh en t h er e wa s con gruence between regulatory focus success and the nature of the judgment would be greater than the relationships which emerged wh en t h er e wa s in con gruence between regulatory focus success and the nature of t h e ju dgm en t t o be made. To eva lu a t e the subsidiary predictions we computed pa r t ia l correlations between regulatory focus success and probability estimates on con gruent tasks (e.g., promotion focus and disjunctive estimates) and then com pa r ed them to the partial correlations between regulatory focus success and probability estimates on incongruent tasks (e.g., prevention focus and disju n ct ive est im a t es). All partial correlations wer e der ived fr om t h e r egr ession analyses, in which we looked at the relationship between regulatory focus su ccess a n d pr oba bilit y est imates, controlling for the other predictors that had been en t er ed into the regression. Fisher z st a t ist ics were computed to compare the partial correlations to determine whether the difference between them wa s sign ifica n t .
Th e r esu lt s sh owed su ppor t for a ll su bsidia r y pr edict ion s. As can be seen in Ta ble 7, t h e posit ive r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d a ccu r a cy 2 Th e m et h od a n d r esu lt s of a st u dy by Mor et t i a n d H iggin s (1990) pr ovide fu r t h er su ggest ive eviden ce t h a t it wa s the relationship between the actual self and ideal/ought standards (rather than either component alone) that was most predictive of participants' probability estimates. Mor etti and Higgins examined whether nomothetic and idiographic measures of the difference bet ween a ct u al self and ideal self predicted self-esteem, indepen den t of a ct u a l self-r a t in gs. Th e nomothetic measure required participants to rate their actual and ideal selves on personality attributes provided by the experimenter (e.g., popularity and honesty). The idiographic measure con sist ed of t h e Selves Qu est ion n a ir e u sed in t h e pr esen t st u dy, in which participa nts generated per son a lly r eleva n t idea l-self a t t r ibu t es befor e r a t in g h ow m u ch t h ey wou ld idea lly like t o h a ve the attributes and the extent to which they actually had the attributes. Moretti and Higgins found that the relation between actual-ideal discrepancy on the nomothetic measure and self-esteem wa s n ot sign ifica n t , beyon d t h a t por t ion of t h e va r ia n ce in self-est eem that could be accounted for by the actual self measure. However, the relationship between actual-ideal discrepancy on the idiogr a ph ic m ea su r e a n d self-est eem wa s sign ifica nt, even when actual self ratings were held con st a nt. As in the Moretti and Higgins study, the actual self-ratings made in the present study wer e idiogr a phic. Moreover, they were assessed in a "relational" context, in that participants rated their actual selves after having rated their corresponding ideal self and ought self standards.
TAB L E 7
Te s t s o f S u b sid ia r y P r e d ict ion s (Con gr u e n t R e la t ion sh ip s vs In con gr u e n t R e la t ion sh ip s) In con gr u en t r ela t ionships 3. P r om ot ion Su ccess-Con ju n ct ive Ϫ.15 (Ϫ.13) 4. P r even t ion Su ccess-Disju n ct ive Ϫ.11 (Ϫ.09) N ote. Numbers in parentheses are for the analyses based on absolute difference scores. In all in st a n ces t h e pa r t ia l cor r ela t ion s a r e sign ifica n t at the .05 level for the congruent relationships and are not significant for the incongruent relationships. All z-scores compa r in g con gruent to in con gr u en t r ela t ion sh ips a r e sign ifica n t a t lea st a t t h e .05 level.
in est imates of disjunctive events was significantly greater than (a) the relationsh ip bet ween pr even t ion focu s su ccess a n d a ccu r a cy in est im a t es of disju n ct ive even t s a n d (b) t h e r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr om ot ion focu s su ccess a n d a ccu r a cy in est im a tes of conjunctive even t s. Mor eover, t h e posit ive r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr even t ion focu s su ccess a nd accuracy in estimates of conjunctive events was sign ifica n t ly greater than (a) the relationship between promotion focus success and accuracy in estimates of conjunctive events and (b) the relationship between prevention focus success and accuracy in estimates of disjunctive events.
DISCUSSION
At t h e outset we suggested that promotion focus is associated with a tendency to "think disjunctively," whereas prevention focus is associated with a tendency to "think conjunctively." That is, the former leads to the perception that any of m u lt iple cou r ses of a ct ion m a y be su fficien t for goa l a t t a in m en t , wh er ea s the latter leads to the perception that all of multiple courses of action are 3 On e-t a iled sign ifica n ce t est s wer e used because Hypotheses 1 and 2, as well as the subsidiary pr edict ion s, a lwa ys wer e dir ect ion a l. It sh ou ld be n ot ed, h owever, t h a t wit h on ly t wo except ion s, the effect s wou ld h a ve been sign ifica n t a t lea st a t t h e .05 level h a d t wo-t a iled sign ifica n ce t est s been u sed. Th e except ion s wer e (a ) the relationship bet ween promotion focu s su ccess a n d estimates of t h e disju n ct ive even t s (dir ect ion a l differ en ce scor e on ly), in wh ich t h e effect wou ld h a ve been sign ifica n t a t t h e .10 level wit h a t wo-t a iled t est (see Ta ble 5); a n d (b) the difference in the relationship between promotion focus success and estimates of the disjunctive events versus the relationship bet ween pr even t ion focu s su ccess a n d est im a t es of t h e disju n ctive events (directional differ en ce scor e on ly), in wh ich t h e effect wou ld h a ve been sign ifica n t a t t h e .06 level wit h a t wotailed t est (see Ta ble 7) . necessary for goal attainment. If this reasoning is correct, then people should make more accurate or less biased probability estimates when the event is con gr u en t wit h t h e dom a in in wh ich t h eir self-r egu la t or y effor t s h a ve been su ccessfu l (pr om ot ion focu s a n d disju n ct ive even t s a n d pr even t ion focu s a n d con junctive events) than when the event is incongruent with the domain in wh ich their self-r egu la t or y effor t s h a ve been su ccessfu l (pr om ot ion focu s a n d con junctive events and prevention focus and disjunctive events). The results len t su ppor t t o a ll of t h ese h ypot h eses. Th e st ronger people's regulatory focus su ccess, t h e m or e a ccu r a t e or less bia sed wer e t h eir pr oba bilit y est im a t es on t h e con gruent tasks (Hypotheses 1 and 2) . Moreover, in support of the subsidiary pr edict ion s, the positive relationships between regulatory focus success and accuracy of probability estimates on congruent events were stronger than the relationships between r egu la t or y focu s su ccess a n d a ccu r a cy of pr oba bilit y est im a tes on the incongruent events.
Im plication s for B eh avioral Decision T h eory
Th e t en den cies t o over est im a t e t h e pr obability of conjunctive events, and to underestimate the proba bility of disjunctive even t s, h a ve been well est a blish ed for qu it e som e t im e in t h e beh a vior a l decision t h eor y lit er a t u r e (e.g., Ba r-H illel, 1973; Tver sky & Ka h n em a n , 1974). Rela t ively few st u dies h a ve exa m in ed, however, factors that make these tendencies more versus less likely to occur. Thus, the present findings are among the first to identify factors associated wit h people's pr on en ess t o m isper ceivin g t h e likelih ood of con ju n ct ive a n d disjunctive events.
Mor eover, by descr ibin g wh en su ch m isper cept ion s occu r, t h e pr esen t fin din gs also help to explain why they occur. Cognitive heuristics can bias people's ju dgm en t s a nd decisions by operating automatically and subtly, sometimes wit h ou t a n y a wa r en ess on t h e decision maker 's part. This viewpoint implies that several factors should influence the degree to which cognitive heuristics lea d t o biased judgments and decisions. One possibility is that heuristic-induced bia s depen ds u pon the extent to which people have access to or are aware of their heu r ist ic-ba sed t h ou gh t processes. Gr ea t er a ccess or a wa r en ess sh ou ld en a ble decision -m a ker s t o ca t ch themselves in the act of making faulty judgments and correct accordingly. In a related vein, training people to think in wa ys t h a t run contrary to heuristic thinking also may reduce the likelihood of heuristic-induced bias. In the present study the judgments that participants made could be deter m in ed object ively ba sed on fu n da m en t al principles of pr obabilit y. In fa ct , t h e n u m ber of cou r ses t h a t pa r t icipa n t s t ook in pr oba bilit y or st a t ist ics h a d a sign ifica n t debia sin g effect on t h eir disju n ct ive pr oba bilit y est im a tes. (Number of courses in pr oba bilit y/st a t ist ics a lso r edu ced bia s in pa r t icipa n t s' con ju nctive estimates, though not to a significant extent.)
Ou r fin din gs h igh ligh t a n additional class of factors (besides awareness and training) which predict heuristic-induced errors in judgment: the motivational or ien t a t ion s inherent to regulatory focus theory. Regulatory focus theory suggest s t h a t it is not necessa r ily t h e level of m ot iva t ion t hat affects people's tendencies to estimate accurately the probabilities of conjunctive and disjunctive events. That is, it is not simply the ca se that people will do better at these tasks by trying harder. Rather, it is the type of m ot iva tion that is influ ential. As t h e pr esen t findings suggest, probability estimates will be more accurate wh en people h a ve been m or e su ccessfu l in their self-regulator y effor t s in t h e dom a in con gr u en t with the nature of the event (promotion focus for disjunctive even t s a n d pr even t ion focus for conjunctive events), but not when their selfregulatory efforts have been more successful in domains incongruent with the event (prevention focu s for disju n ct ive even t s a n d pr om ot ion focu s for con junctive events). Put differently, people who have more mastered the art of bein g pr om ot ion (pr even t ion ) focu sed will be m or e su ccessfu l on ju dgm en t s that require disjunctive (conjunctive) thinking.
Im plication s for R egu latory Focu s T h eory
Promot ion a n d pr even t ion focu s a r e ga in in g pr om in en ce a s det er m in a n t s of im portant cognition s, em ot ion s, a n d beh a vior s (see H iggin s, 1998, for a r eview). For example, the behavior a l decision t h eor y pr in ciple that "losses loom la r ger than gains" depen ds on people's regulatory focus; it holds wh en people a r e pr even t ion focu sed, but not when they are promotion focused (Liberman, Idson, Ca m a ch o, & H iggin s, 1999). Mor eover, t h e cla ssic expect a n cy-va len ce m odel of h u m a n m ot iva t ion a lso h a s been sh own to depen d on people's r egu la t or y focus (Shah & Higgins, 1997) . Accor din g t o Vr oom (1964) a n d ot h er s, expect a ncies a n d va len ces com bin e in t er a ct ively to influence motivation. The nature of the interaction effect is that the relation sh ip bet ween expect a n cy for su ccess and motivation is greater when valence is high rather than low. In a recent ser ies of st u dies, Sh a h a n d H iggin s sh owed that the classic expectancy theory pr edict ion is m oder a t ed by r egulatory focu s; it h olds wh en people a r e pr om ot ion focu sed, but not when they are prevention focused. Even the nature of people's em ot ion a l exper ien ce depen ds u pon t h eir r egu la t or y focu s. When promotion focu sed, people feel joy wh en t h ey su cceed in t h eir self-r egu la t or y effor t s a n d deject ed wh en t h ey fa il. Wh en pr even t ion focu sed, people feel ca lm wh en t h ey su cceed a n d a git a t ed wh en t h ey fa il (H iggin s, Sh a h , & F r iedm a n , 1997).
Th e pr esent findings expand the range of phenomena which may be accounted for by r egu la t or y focu s. The strategic orientation associated with a promotion focu s m a kes t he latter adaptive when the situation requires disjunctive thinkin g, a s in cr ea t ivit y t a sks (Cr owe & H iggin s, 1997), or m or e gen er a lly, t h e planning st a ge of a ct ivit ies in wh ich equifinality exists (e.g., crafting an organiza t ion a l vision ). Th e st r a t egic or ien t a t ion a ssocia t ed wit h a pr even t ion focu s makes the latter adaptive when the situation requires conjunctive thinking. For example, the im plem en tation st a ge of cer t a in a ct ivities (e.g., or ga n iza t ion a l ch a n ge) oft en r equ ir es t h a t a ll a ct ion st eps be su ccessfu lly com plet ed. In t h ese cir cumstances, greater success in pr even t ion focu s sh ou ld lea d t o in cr ea sed understanding of the need to succeed at all of the activities, along with, as the pr esen t fin din gs su ggest , a m or e r ea list ic est im a t e of t h e likelih ood of doin g so.
Altern ative Explan ation s
Th e pr esent findings show that regulatory focus success (promotion and pr even t ion , r espect ively) is a ssocia t ed with the accuracy of participants'probabilit y est imates of compound events (disjunctive and conjunctive, respectively). An a lt ernative possibility is that it is not regulatory focus success, but rather the salience or strength of the regulatory focus that is associated with the accuracy of people's pr oba bilit y est im a t es. P u t differ en t ly, people wh o a ssign gr ea t er sign ifica n ce t o r ea ch in g t h eir pr om ot ion goa ls m a y do bet t er a t est im a tin g disju n ct ive even t s, independent of their success in reaching such goals. Sim ila r ly, people wh o a ssign gr ea t er sign ifica n ce t o r ea ch in g t h eir pr even t ion goa ls m ay do better at estimating conjunctive even t s, r ega r dless of t h eir su ccess in a t t a in in g su ch goa ls. In a r ela t ed vein, the accuracy of people's pr oba bilit y est im a tes may be determined by the interaction between regulatory focus success a n d r egu latory focu s st r ength.
Fortunately, we did include a measure of regulatory focus strength in the pr esen t st u dy wh ich en a bled u s t o eva lu a t e these alternative possibilities. As in pr ior resea r ch on a t t it u de a ccessibilit y (e.g., F a zio, 1995), r egu la t or y focu s st r ength was conceptualized in terms of the degree of access that people had to ju dgments abou t t h eir idea l a n d ou gh t selves. As H iggin s (1998) h a s su ggest ed, "Accessibilit y is a ct iva tion potential and knowledge units with higher activation pot en t ia ls sh ou ld pr odu ce fa st er r espon ses t o kn owledge-r ela t ed in pu t s" (p. 18). Reca ll t h a t participants in the present study were asked to list attributes descr ibin g t h eir idea l a n d ought selves. They also indicated the extent to which they (a) would like to have their ideal self a t t r ibu t es, (b) sh ou ld have their ou gh t self a t t r ibu t es, (c) a ctually had their ideal self attributes, and (d) actually had their ought self attributes. Response latencies wer e a ssessed for ea ch of these judgments. For all participants, we computed separate average latency scor es, on e for t h eir va r ious ideal self-judgments and the other for their various ou gh t self-ju dgm en t s. Regu la t or y focu s st r en gt h wa s ba sed on t h ese m ea su r es of r espon se la t en cy, wit h gr ea t er strength bein g r eflect ed in lower r espon se la t en cies. F or t h eor et ica l a n d em pir ica l eviden ce of t h e con st r u ct va lidit y of this measure of regu la tory focus st rength, see H iggin s (1998) a n d H iggin s, Sh a h , a n d F r iedm a n (1997).
Th e m ea su r es of promotion and prevention strength were then added to the previously described r egr ession a n a lyses of est im a tes of disjunctive and con junctive events. The effect of regulatory focus strength was not significant in a ll a n a lyses of bot h dir ect ion a l a n d absolute differ en ce scor es; a ll p va lu es wer e Ͼ.25. Im por t a ntly, however, the effect of r egu la t ory focus su ccess always remained significant in these analyses at least at the .05 level.
We t h en a dded t h e corresponding interaction between regulatory focus success a n d r egu latory focus strength to the various regression analyses. That is, in the analyses of disju n ctive even t s we a dded t h e in t er a ct ion bet ween pr om ot ion su ccess a n d pr om ot ion st r ength, and in the analyses of conjunctive events we added the interaction between pr even t ion su ccess a n d pr even t ion st r en gt h . In no instance did the in t er a ct ion effect a ppr oach significance (all p va lu es Ͼ.15).
Ta ken t oget h er, these additional analyses including regulatory focus strength sh ow t h a t it h a d n eit h er a m a in effect n or a m oder a t in g in flu en ce in t h e pr esen t st u dy. Ra t h er, it was regulatory focus success that predicted the accuracy of pa r t icipa n t s' pr oba bilit y est im a t es of disjunctive and conjunctive events.
Lim itation s/S uggestion s for Future R esearch
The present study has a number of limitations. In calling attention to them, we simultaneously are suggesting avenues for future research. First, the internal validity of the present findings is limited. Because regulatory focus was measured, all of our findings are correlational. The fact that the relationships between regulatory focus success and accuracy of probability estimates were significantly stronger when the event was congruent rather than incongruent is somewhat reassuring that regulatory focus had a causal impact on the accuracy of participants'probability estimates. Nevertheless, future research is needed which uses designs that allow for st r on ger for m s of ca u sa l in fer en ce (e.g., in wh ich r egu la t or y focu s su ccess is experimentally manipulated). Second, the external validity of ou r fin din gs is r est r icted in that the participants were college students, the task was abstract, and the setting was a research laboratory. At the outset we suggested that in everyday life people often have to make judgments of the likelihood of con ju n ct ive a n d disju n ct ive events. Future research is needed to evaluate whether regulatory focus success influences the accuracy of people's estimates of conjunctive and disjunctive events in more naturalistic settings.
Finally, future research is needed to explain more precisely why promotion su ccess pr edict s t h e a ccu r a cy of disju n ct ive (bu t not conjunctive) estimates and wh y pr evention success pr edict s the accuracy of con ju n ct ive (bu t n ot disju n ctive) estimates. We suggested at the outset that a promotion focus may predispose people t o t h in k disjunctively, whereas a prevention focus may predispose people t o t h in k con ju n ct ively. Th u s, gr ea t er su ccess in a r espect ive r egu la t or y focu s dom a in will lea d t o gr ea t er su ccess (a ccu r a cy) in t h e pr oba bilit y estimates for t h e cor r espon din g t ype of ju dgm en t . Th is is n ot t o sa y t h a t t h e pr ocess of trying to achieve promotion goals never requires conjunctive judgments. For cer t a in pr om ot ion goa ls, or for cer t a in a spect s of t h e pr ocess of t r yin g t o a ch ieve pr om ot ion goa ls, t h e a ssu m pt ion t h a t a n y on e of m u lt iple cou r ses of a ct ion is su fficien t m a y n ot be wa r r a n t ed. Con sider, for exa m ple, t h e pr om ot ion -focu sed goal of accumulating vast wealth. Once people make the transition from formula t in g the goal and determining that it may be accomplished through any of a number of routes (e.g., Wall Street trading or winning the lottery) to trying to im plem en t the goal through the chosen route, they are likely to find that the implementation process requires a conjunction of elements. For example, for t h e Wa ll St r eet t r a din g r ou t e t h e con ju n ct ion cou ld in clu de pickin g good st ocks an d raising capital to invest an d sellin g a t t h e r igh t t im e an d reinvesting wisely. Wh en ever it is not sufficien t t o ch oose on e of sever a l possible a lt er n atives to attain a promotion goal, (e.g., during the implementation process of a pr om ot ion goa l), t h en gr ea t er pr om ot ion su ccess sh ou ld n ot n ecessa r ily lea d to more accurate probability estimates. If anything, if the implementation pr ocess r equ ires a conjunction of necessary actions, then greater prevention su ccess m a y lea d t o a m or e a ccurate probability estimate. The present findings su ggest t h a t people wh o a r e su ccessfu l in the promot ion dom a in a r e m or e likely to set promotion goals and identify equifinal ways to achieve the goals, but then leave the implementation process, which requires a conjunction of events, to (the thought processes of) others.
Nor a r e we sa yin g t h at the process of trying to achieve prevention goals can never be associated with disjunctive thinking. For certain aspects of the process of t r yin g to achieve prevention goals, the assumption that multiple courses of action are necessary may not be warranted; instead, any one of the multiple cou r ses of a ct ion m a y be sufficient. Consider, for exa m ple, t h e pr even t ionfocu sed goa l of t r yin g t o h eigh t en home security. Each step of the implementation of t h is goa l cou ld en t a il disju n ct ive t hinking. For example, to keep burglars ou t on e could install window bars or bu y a security syst em or hire an armed gu a r d or move to a safer neighborhood. While it is t h eor et ica lly possible for this stage of the implementation of this prevention goal to allow for disjunctive thinking, we speculate that quite often it is not necessary for the person to en ga ge in t h is t ype of a n a lysis. In deed, doin g so could be quite onerous. That is, im a gin e the amount of cognitive effort required if, for each of t h e m u ltiple elem en t s n eeded for su ccessfu l im plem en t a t ion , t h e pr even t ion focu sed per son en ga ged in a disjunctive process of considering his/her various alternatives. Th e n u m ber of decision s t o be made could be paralyzing. Given t h a t people oft en do n ot develop m u lt iple a lt er n a t ives for sin gle decision s, it seem s even less likely t h a t they would do so for a decision process with multiple components; i.e., they would exper ien ce "ch oice over loa d." 4 In summary, we have assumed that the pursuit of promotion goals requires disju n ct ive r ea son in g (in which the successfu l en a ct m en t of on e of sever a l cou r ses of a ct ion is su fficien t for goa l a t t a in m en t ). Mor eover, we h a ve a ssu m ed that the pursuit of prevention goals requires conjunctive reasoning (in which the successful enactment of multiple courses of action is necessary for goal attainment). However, under those conditions in which these assumptions are not warranted, the present findings showing greater disjunctive (conjunctive) accuracy among persons with greater promotion (prevention) success should be less likely t o em er ge.
CONCLUSION
Th e pr esent study shows that people's regulatory focus success is related to the accuracy of their probability estimates of both conjunctive and disjunctive tasks. These findings have important implica t ion s both for beh a vior a l decision theory and for regulatory focus theory. Although regulatory focus theory is pr om in en t in socia l/per son a lit y psych ology (Higgin s, 1997 (Higgin s, , 1998 , it h a s r eceived fa r less a t t en t ion fr om or ga n iza t ion a l sch ola r s. We h ope t h a t t h e pr esen t st u dy a nd related theorizing (Brockner & Higgins, in press) stimulates students of or ga n iza t ion a l beh a vior t o explor e t h e r ole t h a t r egu la t or y focu s pr ocesses pla y in sh aping people's work attitudes and behaviors.
